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Abstract—As active network defence systems, honeypots are
commonly used as a decoy to inspect attackers and their attack
tactics in order to improve the cybersecurity infrastructure of an or-
ganisation. A honeypot may be successful provided that it disguises
its identity. However, cyberattackers continuously endeavour to
discover honeypots for evading any deception and bolstering their
attacks. Active fingerprinting attack is one such technique that
may be used to discover honeypots by sending specially designed
traffic. Preventing a fingerprinting attack is possible but doing that
may hinder the process of dealing with the attackers, counteracting
the purpose of a honeypot. Instead, detecting an attempted finger-
printing attack in real-time can enhance a honeypot’s capability,
uninterruptedly managing any immediate consequences and pre-
venting the honeypot being identified. Nevertheless, it is difficult to
detect and predict an attempted fingerprinting attack due to the
challenge of isolating it from other similar attacks, particularly
when imprecise observations are involved in the monitoring of
the traffic. Dynamic fuzzy rule interpolation (D-FRI) enables an
adaptive approach for effective reasoning with such situations by
exploiting the best of both inference and interpolation. The dynamic
rules produced by D-FRI facilitate approximate reasoning with
perpetual changes that often occur in this type of application, where
dynamic rules are required to cover new network conditions. This
paper proposes a D-FRI-Honeypot, an enhanced honeypot running
D-FRI framework in conjunction with Principal Component Anal-
ysis, to detect and predict an attempted fingerprinting attack on
honeypots. This D-FRI-Honeypot works with a sparse rule base but
is able to detect active fingerprinting attacks when it does not find
any matching rules. Also, it learns from current network conditions
and offers a dynamically enriched rule base to support more pre-
cise detection. This D-FRI-Honeypot is tested against five popular
fingerprinting tools (namely, Nmap, Xprobe2, NetScanTools Pro,
SinFP3 and Nessus), to demonstrate its successful applications.
Index Terms—Dynamic fuzzy rule interpolation, D-FRI,
Honeypot, D-FRI-Honeypot, fingerprinting attack, sparse rule
base, principal components analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
CYBERATTACKERS are becoming more sophisticatedand devious in their attacks involving artificial intelligence
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(AI) [1]–[3]. This requires more and better countermeasures
from cyber experts exploiting the same technological develop-
ments in AI [2], in addition to conventional passive or active
defence systems as a part of defensive strategies [4]. Honeypots,
as a form of active defence systems, are commonly used as
a decoy to inspect attackers and their sophisticated attacking
tactics, in an effort to improve the cybersecurity infrastructure
of an organisation [5], [6].
A. Research Motivations
A honeypot may be successful as long as it disguises its
identity. However, cyberattackers continuously endeavour to
discover honeypots for evading any deception and bolstering
their attacks. Active fingerprinting attack is one such technique
that can be used to discover honeypots by sending specially
designed traffic. If it is identified by an attacker, it can be abused
as a bot to attack others and even its own network [5], [7],
[8]. Preventing a fingerprinting attack is possible but such an
action may hinder the process of its dealing with the attackers,
thereby counter-acting the purpose of a honeypot [9]. Instead,
detecting an attempted fingerprinting attack in real-time can
enhance the capability of a honeypot. This is because it helps
ensure uninterrupted dealing of the honeypot while managing
any immediate consequences, including prevention of its own
function from other malicious honeypots. Unfortunately, little
work exists to detect and predict an attempted fingerprinting
attack on honeypots because it is very difficult to isolate such an
attack from many of the similar ones, especially when imprecise
observations regarding the network traffic are involved. There-
fore, this research is set to investigate various fingerprinting
attacks. It proposes an intelligent and adaptive technique for
detecting and predicting an attempted fingerprinting attack on
honeypot, in an effort to enhance the capability of a honeypot.
In the context of present application studies, both the observa-
tions of and the knowledge available for detecting fingerprinting
attacks are often described in imprecise terms. This means that
a system built for such applications must be able to handle ill-
defined variable values and vague statements. Fuzzy rule-based
reasoning can help in this regard, being one of the most popular
techniques for designing rule-based intelligent systems that meet
such a requirement. The efficacy of a fuzzy rule-based system
is largely dependent on its underlying rule base. Typically, such
a system infers the conclusion based on any matching rules in
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the given rule base. Yet, this type of system can only be used
effectively when the rule base is dense (i.e., it covers all, or at
least almost all input conditions). Practically speaking, it may
not be possible to attain such a dense rule base, especially when
coping with novel networks. Even if it is attainable to devise a
dense rule base, the use of such a rule base may cause adverse
effects on computational overheads and redundancy. Fuzzy rule
interpolation (FRI) [10]–[12] has been proposed to perform
approximate reasoning with just a sparse rule base. However,
in both cases of dense and sparse rule bases, largely the rule
base is static with no mechanism to update it, which can make it
ineffectual in long run if it is not updated over time. This forms
a significant challenge for the potential successful applications
of fuzzy systems to cybersecurity problems.
To tackle the aforementioned specific challenge, dynamic
fuzzy rule interpolation (D-FRI) has been developed, enabling
the induction and exploitation of the most updated and dynamic
rule base during the FRI process [13]. Indeed, D-FRI offers an
integrated framework for inference and interpolation and can
be used with any fuzzy intelligent system irrespective of the
type of its underlying rule base. It benefits the cybersecurity
applications through its ability of assisting in the monitoring
of perpetual changing traffic conditions within a given network.
This is evident from its initial applications in the area, such as D-
FRI-Snort [14], D-FRI-WinFirewall [15], D-FRI-CiscoFirewall
[16], ID-Honeypot [17] and VD-Honeypot [18]. Building on
these original attempts, D-FRI is herein utilised again to develop
a D-FRI-Honeypot for detecting or predicting active fingerprint-
ing attacks on honeypots.
B. Main Contributions
The work proposed herein helps enhance the capability of
a honeypot to conceal its own identity, thereby enabling itself
to successfully perform its function. In particular, it makes the
following major contributions to the relevant literature:
 A methodology to detect and prevent fingerprinting attacks
to (cyber security) honeypots that can both run and also
learn online. The methodology offers an automated means
for dealing with the challenging problem of only having
a sparse, and imprecisely described, rule base for the
detection of fingerprinting attacks.
 Active fingerprinting attacks are simulated on a given
honeypot to collect attack data (i.e., TCP/IP packets). The
simulation is accomplished by employing the KFSensor
honeypot and Nmap and Xprobe2 fingerprinting tools, with
the simulated attack data captured in two different logs,
respectively by the use of KFSensor directly and with
Wireshark analyser for forensic analysis.
 A number of the important fields of collected TCP/IP pack-
ets are empirically examined to ascertain abnormalities or
patterns as an indication of an attempted fingerprinting
attack, with the classical principal component analysis
(PCA) exploited to determine the most influential fields,
which are further utilised to develop an effective approach
to predicting fingerprinting attacks.
 D-FRI is applied to correctly correlate the identified in-
fluential fields and to predict fingerprinting attacks and
their severity level. The resulting system, dubbed D-FRI-
Honeypot hereafter, is successfully tested against five
popular fingerprinting tools, including both Nmap and
Xprobe2 (that have been used in the development of D-
FRI-Honeypot) and three other tools: NetScanTools Pro,
SinFP3 and Nessus, neither of these new tools has been
involved in building the D-FRI-Honeypot previously.
C. Content Organisation
The rest of this paper is organised into the subsequent sections:
Section II explains the basic concepts regarding D-FRI, honey-
pots and fingerprinting attacks, including operating system fin-
gerprinting. Section III describes the simulation and analysis of
fingerprinting attacks on honeypots for the collection of empir-
ical data. Section IV discusses a comprehensive examination of
the chosen TCP/IP fields and their related abnormalities/patterns
as signs of a fingerprinting attack. Section V presents the design
and development of a D-FRI-Honeypot for discovering and
predicting fingerprinting attacks on honeypots. Section VI shows
the testing results of the implemented D-FRI-Honeypot system.
Section VII discusses the main limitations of D-FRI-Honeypot,
and Section VIII concludes the paper and points out possible
improvements of this work.
II. BACKGROUND
This section introduces the basic concepts upon which to
develop the work to be presented in the subsequent sections.
A. Dynamic Fuzzy Rule Interpolation (D-FRI)
The conventional fuzzy reasoning systems infer any outcomes
using a dense rule base that covers the problem domain. When
it is not possible for the rules available to cover the complete
domain then a situation involving the use of a sparse rule base
results. The most effective way to draw outcomes under such sce-
narios is the utilisation of an FRI system. These two procedures,
of inference and interpolation, can be combined for designing
more effective fuzzy systems using the sparse rule base. The
integrated system can offer several benefits such as performing
conventional inference with the sparse rule base and hence, min-
imising computational overheads (as rule interpolation requires
more computation). Nonetheless, the effectiveness of such an
integrated system may be affected due to the static nature of
the sparse rule base as it demands an additional mechanism for
intelligent learning and adaptation of the rule base as the problem
domain evolves.
The providential, dynamic fuzzy rule interpolation (D-FRI)
is particularly developed to address this issue, which offers
the most updated rule base during a problem-solving process,
through the utilisation of FRI [13]. It can also be used to
gradually develop a dense rule base from an original sparse
rule base if needed. The D-FRI system is the result of an
integration of fuzzy inference, fuzzy rule interpolation, and
dynamic rule learning and adaptation techniques. As such, it
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Fig. 1. Dynamic fuzzy rule interpolation (D-FRI) [13].
offers a generic framework to encompass a wide range of fuzzy
inference and interpolation mechanisms. However, in this work,
the Mamdani’s fuzzy inference [19] and transformation-based
rule interpolation (T-FRI) [20] techniques are utilised due to
their popularity and availability. The design and working stages
of D-FRI are illustrated in Fig. 1 and its further details can be
found in [13].
B. Honeypots
A honeypot is a concealed security system that functions
as a decoy to entice cyberattackers to reveal their information
[21]. It deceives, detects and diverts cyberattackers, whereas
concurrently gathering their information [7]. Most honeypots
are used to imitate the functionalities of a real network so that
cyberattackers may interpret such a system as the real network
to carry out attacks, thereby revealing information regarding the
attacker [8]. They are installed to entail constantly observations
to uncover the vulnerabilities and new attacks to the underlying
real network and to develop an enhanced defensive strategy [22].
However, honeypots should not be used as a defensive system
to protect the network. Honeypots are categorized into two cate-
gories on the basis of their design and level of activity with cyber-
attackers [23]: low-interaction honeypots and high-interaction
honeypots. Low-interaction honeypots normally imitate real
systems and have restricted communication with cyberattackers;
whereas, high-interaction honeypots are normally real systems
and have unrestricted communication with cyberattackers [18].
Low-interaction honeypots are most commonly used honeypots
due to their benefits of limited resources, overheads and inter-
action with attackers, and therefore, this research work has also
employed it.
C. Fingerprinting Attack
In a fingerprinting attack, an attacker typically sends a se-
quence of fabricated packets to a target system or network [24].
It does so to provoke a response in the form of packets con-
taining fingerprint information with the intention of obtaining
the target’s identification. Fingerprinting attacks are categorised
into two categories on the basis of the activity of cyberattackers:
active and passive fingerprinting attacks. In an active fingerprint-
ing attack, cyberattackers send carefully constructed packets to
the target, analysing their response packets to extract finger-
printing information [21]. In a passive fingerprinting attack,
cyberattackers do not send any packets to the target, instead
they sniff, capture and analyse traffic from the target to extract
fingerprinting information [21]. Active fingerprinting attacks are
more accurate than passive fingerprinting attacks as the result is
based on the direct response from the target. Therefore, in this
design of D-FRI-Honeypot, only an active fingerprinting attack
is considered.
D. OS Fingerprinting Attack
Operating system (OS) fingerprinting is the most prevalent
fingerprinting type of attack, which is performed on a target
system or network to obtain specific information regarding its
OS, services, device type and type of architecture [25]. The
mechanism is to send a stream of fabricated TCP/IP packets from
the attacker to elicit response TCP/IP packets containing finger-
print information of the target [26]. After analysing a number of
the fields of certain TCP/IP protocols of the response packets, a
fingerprint is constructed and compared against the fingerprint
database to find the exact or closest matched fingerprint of the
target. Cyberattackers are highly successful in performing OS
fingerprinting attacks as the same TCP/IP protocol suite is imple-
mented by every OS differently, resulting in different responses
for the same TCP/IP query. Consequently, different responses
generated by different operating systems divulge substantial in-
formation about a given system to cyberattackers. The complete
process of an OS fingerprinting attack is dependent on TCP/IP
protocol suite. As such, it is sometimes referred to as TCP/IP
stack fingerprinting. Most low-interaction honeypots simulate
several OSs in order to presents an illusion of real OSs, which
makes this OS fingerprinting attack more crucial to discover
any low-interaction honeypot easily. Moreover, having obtained
precise information about the OS of the target, cyberattackers
can launch more complex attacks with grater severity against
the target system or network.
III. SIMULATION OF OS FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS
Every OS implements the TCP/IP protocol suite differently.
This, acquisition of a fingerprint of any OS requires the analysis
of the TCP/IP packets sent by that OS. The process of finding
a fingerprint of a particular OS is therefore, primarily based
on the examination of the TCP, ICMP and UDP protocols as
in general, every fingerprinting tool or technique sends and
receives these three protocol-based packets differently to a
target system. However, certain fingerprinting tools/techniques
primarily employ TCP packets to perform the fingerprinting
attack and certain primarily employ ICMP packets, thus, the
development of any successful method to detect this attack
should involve examination of both categories (TCP and ICMP)
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TABLE I
NMAP AND XPROBE2 OS FINGERPRINTING ATTACK SCRIPTS
of tools/techniques. Reflecting this practical observation, the
present simulation covers both TCP-based and ICMP-based OS
fingerprinting attacks, in an effort to acquire the type of OS
fingerprint (and also, information about the associated services)
of a honeypot that may reveal its identity.
A. TCP-Based OS Fingerprinting Attacks Using Nmap
Nmap is the most powerful and reliable scanning tool which
is very effective in delivering an OS fingerprinting attack, being
mainly TCP-based. Many Nmap scripts use heuristics and fuzzy
signature matching to derive conclusions about a target host OS
or services [27]. During an OS fingerprinting attack, Nmap sends
a stream of TCP/IP packets, to identified open and closed ports
on the target. This stream of TCP/IP packets contains TCP, UDP,
and ICMP packets. These packets/probes are aimed at several
existing ambiguities and their exploitation in terms of standard
protocol Request-for-Comments (RFCs). When the target sends
a reply back to Nmap regarding these packets, the fingerprinting
tool analyses the values of various parameters of the TCP, ICMP
and UDP packets and constructs an OS fingerprint to match
against the database of OS signatures it contains [28]. Depending
on the OS signature matching result, it predicts the possible OS
of the target. If there is no exact match then an integrated fuzzy
representation and inference mechanism is used to perform such
a prediction [29].
Table I(a) shows the five different Nmap scripts that may
be used for an OS fingerprinting attack. The first Nmap script
is the basic OS fingerprinting command that reveals the OS
fingerprints and other details such as OS version numbers, device
type and architectural information. The second script offers
more descriptive fingerprinting information such as OS type,
device type, host script and traceroute. The third utilises fuzzy
techniques to predict the closest matched OS (in percentage), in
the event that it does not find any exact match. The fourth is used
to perform OS fingerprinting continuously for the given number
of attempts to improve the accuracy of prediction. The fifth,
and the final Nmap script is completely different from the other
four, utilising a different signature database for matching any
fingerprint. It discovers information relating to various services
running on different ports such as HTTP, FTP, SMTP, SSH,
Telnet and DNS. This script can be executed with a different
intensity (ranging from 0 to 9 with 9 being the highest intensity)
to improve the accuracy of prediction [30].
Particularly, the first four Nmap scripts employ the Nmap
database called nmap-os-db [31], and the fifth Nmap script
utilises the Nmap database called nmap-services [32]. For ac-
curacy and to discount any outlier data, each Nmap script (with
various sub-options) is executed 100 times to record the results
under various network conditions while observing retransmitted
packet patterns.
B. ICMP-Based OS Fingerprinting Attacks Using Xprobe2
Nmap is a powerful and reliable fingerprinting tool, however,
its results are largely dependent upon the TCP packets sent.
An ICMP-based fingerprinting simulation and analysis becomes
an essential alternative in order to propose a generic solution.
Xprobe2 is one of the first ICMP-based fingerprinting tools,
which is herein employed for such simulation. It utilises ICMP
packets and is based on the notion of signature engine supported
by fuzzy signature matching [33].
During an OS fingerprinting attack, Xprobe2 sends a stream
of TCP/IP packets, to identified open and closed ports on the
target [34]. This stream of TCP/IP packets contains ICMP,
TCP, and UDP packets. In particular, Xprobe2 consists of 13
modules (whilst versions such as Xprobe2++ and Xprobe2-
ng consist of an additional 3 modules (fingerprint:icmp_info,
app:ftp, and app:http), when used to find an OS fingerprint
[34]. This tool is both more effective and quicker than Nmap
due to the utilisation of a fewer number of TCP/IP packets.
Unfortunately, it is obsolete and not updated. Thus, it is unable
to ascertain newer OSs including Windows 7 on the honeypot
system. Nonetheless, the present work is focused on the de-
velopment of a counter strategy for identifying and predicting
an OS fingerprinting attack. Having recognised that Xprobe2 is
the very first ICMP-based OS fingerprinting tool, forming the
basis for all subsequent ICMP-based OS fingerprinting tools, it
is imperative to investigate Xprobe2-based simulation.
Table I(b) shows the five different Xprobe2 scripts for an
OS fingerprinting attack. The first Xprobe2 script is a basic
OS fingerprinting command that determines a fingerprint of an
OS running on an intended system as per its basic operation
[33]. The second Xprobe2 script determines a fingerprint of
an OS depending on the utilisation of specific modules, which
can provide different results based on the selected modules.
The third Xprobe2 script determines a fingerprint of an OS by
sending more traffic to an intended system because switch −B
sends consecutive TCP handshake requests to any open TCP
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Fig. 2. Investigated fields of TCP Header for attempted OS fingerprinting
attack.
port such as 80, 443, 23, 21, 25, 22, 139, 445 and 6000 on an
intended system and expects a SYN ACK reply [35]. The fourth
Xprobe2 script determines a fingerprint of an OS by utilising an
internal port scanning module, that performs a port scanning of
indicated TCP and/or UDP port(s) [35]. The fifth Xprobe2 script
determines a fingerprint of an OS by utilising additional details
regarding a protocol, port and the current status via switch −p.
The protocol can be chosen from TCP or UDP, the port number
from 1 to 65535, and the current status (Open or Closed) of a
port. In case of a closed port, an intended system may reply
with RST packet for a TCP port, and may reply with ICMP Port
Unreachable packet for a UDP port. In case of an open port, an
intended system may reply with SYN ACK packet for a TCP
port, and may not reply (send a packet) for a UDP port [35].
Note that similar to the simulation with Nmap, to obtain
accurate results while removing any outliers in the data, each
Xprobe2 script (with various sub-options) is executed 100 times.
This helps record the results under different network conditions
and observe patterns of retransmitted packets.
IV. IDENTIFICATION OF OS FINGERPRINTING ATTACKS
The simulation data for both TCP and ICMP based OS finger-
printing attacks collected in the previous section is analysed in
this section. Each stream of TCP/IP packets received from an at-
tacker is analysed to reveal any observed abnormalities/patterns
in the various fields of TCP/IP protocols (i.e., TCP, ICMP, UDP
and IP). This analysis identifies ten indicator fields of TCP/IP
protocols with respect to the detected discrepancies in the attack
simulation data (see Figs. 2 and 3). Additionally, these ten
TCP/IP fields are analysed to emphasise their weight based
on the literature and the core attack principles of popular OS
fingerprinting tools/techniques.
A. Abnormalities/Patterns in TCP Flags
TCP comprises six standard flags (SYN, ACK, URG, PSH,
RST, FIN), controlling the nature and flow of the transmission.
There are several flags or combinations of flags which are
considered as abnormal or illegal ones based on the RFCs of
TCP. Yet, there is no explanation regarding the handling of
Fig. 3. Investigated fields of IP Header for attempted OS fingerprinting attack,
Fig. 4. Captured TCP packet with URG/PSH/FIN probing during OS finger-
printing attack.
Fig. 5. Captured TCP packet with NULL probing during OS fingerprinting
attack.
such abnormal/illegal flags. Different OS’s generate different
responses for an abnormal/illegal flag or combination of such
flags. This is a significant concern for the security community
as attackers generally exploit these responses to determine the
OS of the target. Thus, identification of a number of these
abnormal/illegal TCP flags can be utilised as a good indicator
of an OS fingerprinting attack, which is relatively straightfor-
ward to find as they are well known. Certain OS fingerprinting
tools also utilise additional control flags (e.g., CWR, ECN) and
Reserved Bits in their attack techniques. Examples of these
abnormal/illegal TCP flags are:
 URG/PSH/FIN Probing – See Fig. 4
 NULL Packet – See Fig. 5
 Reserved Bit Probing – See Fig. 6
 ECN-Echo Probing – See Fig. 6
 FIN Probing
 SYN/FIN Probing
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Fig. 6. Captured TCP packet with Reserved Bit and ECN-Echo probing during
OS fingerprinting attack.
B. Abnormalities/Patterns in TCP Options
Most fingerprinting tools exploit the TCP Options field of a
TCP header because it is an adaptable field and can be of any
size ranging from 0 to 40 bytes. A TCP options field may contain
a subset of or all the following attributes: Maximum Segment
Size (MSS), Window Scaling, Selective Acknowledgements
(SACK), Timestamps, and Nop. Therefore, every OS customises
the TCP Options field based on its implementation which can be
identified as a pattern of that OS. Conversely, the TCP options
field can be used to identify an OS fingerprinting attack by
finding abnormalities/patterns in the packets received from an
attacker. Of course, this can be combined with other indicators
as a sign of an OS fingerprinting attack.
C. Abnormal Use of TCP Urgent Pointer
TCP provides the facility to mark certain amount of data as
urgent, which is indicated by setting the URG flag. This Urgent
Pointer field indicates how much of the data in the segment is
urgent. This field and URG flag jointly allow an application
to forward urgent data immediately by creating a secondary
out of band channel without waiting in sequential send queue.
Nonetheless, most users are uncertain about using this field
correctly. Thus, this ambiguity offers a possible opportunity to
attackers to exploit this field for a fingerprinting attack. At the
same time, the improper use of this Urgent Pointer may reveal
a potential OS fingerprinting attack.
D. Abnormalities in TCP Window Size
TCP Window Size is important field to decide the total amount
of bytes that can be sent successfully without waiting for an ac-
knowledgement. TCP Window Size is maintained by both sender
and receiver due to the bidirectional nature of TCP, however,
fixed limit is determined by receiver. This field is mainly used for
network troubleshooting, application baselining or preventing
network congestion at the receiver end. This is the important
field for flow control and could be exploited for a fingerprinting
attack. Equally, this TCP Window Size can be looked at for
finding substantial discrepancies and repetitive cases of zero
windows that could reveal a potential OS fingerprinting attack.
E. Abnormal Use of IP Type of Service (TOS)
This is an IP datagram field that is used to describe its various
quality of services. It is an 8-bit field consisting of several
quality parameters, namely, Precedence, Speed, Throughput,
Reliability and Cost. The TOS field is commonly redefined
as the Differentiated Services Code Point (DSCP). Some of
the QoS parameters may not be frequently used in regular
communications; therefore, their frequent or anomalous use may
reveal irregular actions and perhaps the probability of an OS
fingerprinting attack.
F. Abnormalities/Commonalities in IP Identification (IPID)
In a TCP/IP network, the maximum size of a datagram is
limited to the processing capacity of that network, which is
called the Maximum Transmission Unit (MTU). Therefore, the
successful data transmission process requires fragmentation of
all those datagrams, which are greater than the MTU. The
IPID field facilitates fragmentation (and later reassembly) of
IP datagrams with a unique ID, which is incremented whenever
an IP datagram is sent from source to the destination. This IPID
is used to reassemble all fragmented IP datagrams (which will
have the same IPID) at the receiver end. The exact order of
the fragmented datagrams during the reassembly is determined
by the fragment offset. The More Fragments (MF) flag is used
to determine if fragmentation is allowed, and whether more
fragments are pending. Similarly, the Don’t Fragment (DF) flag
is used to deny fragmentation, resulting the drop of packets
greater than the MTU size.
The updated specification of the IPID Field (RFC 6864) states
that it must not be utilised for any purpose other than fragmen-
tation (and reassembly) [36]. However, it is not uncommon to
set its value to zero while using it for numerous pings, and for
numerous SYN-ACKs from the same source. Irrespective of
IPID standard guidelines, its implementation is still ambiguous,
which leads to its exploitation by attackers for various types of
attacks and possibly a fingerprinting attack. Similarly, this field
can be analysed for various sequences of IPID or commonality
of fragmented packets of the same IPID number for finding a
sign an OS fingerprinting attack.
G. Abnormalities in IP Time-to-Live (TTL) Value
The IP TTL field is used to determine the lifetime of an
IP datagram in the network. It can be defined as a counter or
timestamp and once it is elapsed, the corresponding IP datagram
is discarded or revalidated. This field was added to the IP header
to restrict the time an IP datagram can spend on any network due
to the connectionless nature of IP. This field can be exploited to
perform various kinds of attacks including an OS fingerprinting
attack, where an abnormal TTL value or a TTL value of less than
or equal to one can be used. Conversely, these TTL abnormalities
may provide a sign of an OS fingerprinting attack.
H. Abnormalities/Patterns in UDP Requests
UDP is a very useful protocol in many probing techniques
due to its connectionless nature. All OS fingerprinting tools
use UDP packets in conjunction with TCP/ICMP packets to
collect fingerprinting information from the target. An attacker
sends UDP packets to a port of the target and it may or may
not receive any response, depending on the state of a port
Authorized licensed use limited to: ASTON UNIVERSITY. Downloaded on October 08,2020 at 13:28:36 UTC from IEEE Xplore.  Restrictions apply. 
This article has been accepted for inclusion in a future issue of this journal. Content is final as presented, with the exception of pagination.
NAIK et al.: D-FRI-HONEYPOT: A SECURE STING OPERATION FOR HACKING THE HACKERS 7
Fig. 7. D-FRI-Honeypot for predicting OS fingerprinting attacks on honeypots.
being open or closed. The target replies with an ICMP error
message Destination Unreachable (ICMP Type 3) if the port is
closed; otherwise, it receives no reply for an open or filtered
port. Generally, an UDP packet used in OS fingerprinting is
either empty or set to a fixed payload. An attacker can also set
an IP DF flag in the UDP packet that can prompt the target
to reply with an ICMP error message. These symptoms can be
found in the UDP packets received from an attacker to identify
an OS fingerprinting attack. Also, this can be combined with
other indicators as a sign of such an attack.
I. Abnormalities/Patterns in ICMP Requests
ICMP is an error announcing protocol that is used for trou-
bleshooting, and for providing control and error message ser-
vices. It may be particularly employed by network devices (e.g.,
routers, gateways, hosts) to announce error messages when there
is an issue in delivering packets. As a result, an attacker can
exploit legitimate ICMP request packets to collect significant
information about an OS of the target. Such packets include:
ICMP Echo Request (Type 8), ICMP Router Solicitation Re-
quest (Type 10), ICMP Timestamp Request (Types 13), ICMP
Information Request (Type 15 -Deprecated) and ICMP Address
Mask Request (Type 17 -Deprecated).
Most OS fingerprinting tools utilise abnormal ICMP requests
by changing certain parameters of the aforementioned ICMP
requests. For example, an abnormal ICMP Echo request (Type
8) can be easily determined by examining its Code value. This
is because such a value should always be Code 0, but certain OS
fingerprinting tools use an invalid Code value in their attacks.
These abnormalities can be found in the ICMP request packets
received from an attacker to identify an OS fingerprinting attack.
They can also be combined with other indicators as a sign of an
OS fingerprinting attack.
J. Abnormalities/Patterns in ICMP Packet Size
ICMP packets are normally used to report errors in a standard
format and therefore, their sizes are relatively stable with respect
to the OS, within a predictable range. When the common size
of an ICMP packet is determined as a network baseline, it
is relatively straightforward to compare normal and abnormal
ICMP packets without investigating their contents in detail. For
example, in Nmap-based experimental simulation, the baseline
size was 74 bytes (as with the most common ICMP packet size
in Windows), and the sizes of two collected ICMP packets by
KFSensor Honeypot are 149 to 179. The recorded sizes of the
ICMP packets for all the Nmap experimental iterations are the
same. This is a clear indication of abnormality/pattern found in
the ICMP request packets received from a likely OS fingerprint-
ing attacker. This can be combined with other indicators as a
sign of an OS fingerprinting attack, of course.
V. D-FRI-HONEYPOT FOR PREDICTING FINGERPRINTING
ATTACKS ON HONEYPOTS
The development of D-FRI-Honeypot is herein based on
D-FRI, supported by Principal Components Analysis (PCA).
In particular, PCA is used to determine the most influential
TCP/IP fields from the earlier analysed TCP/IP fields, which
are subsequently employed by D-FRI to predict or detect an
OS fingerprinting attack. The working procedure of this D-FRI-
Honeypot is shown in Fig. 7.
A. Determining the Most Influential TCP/IP Fields
Principal Components Analysis is one of the most effec-
tive computational techniques for data dimensionality reduction
(DR) while retaining most of the information contained with the
original data. In this work, the primary reasons for the preferred
choice of PCA over alternative DR techniques are:
 that reduced number of TCP/IP fields means decreased
requirements for capacity and memory, enabling a
lightweight system;
 that it is a very efficient technique for data involving not
very high dimensionality, which is the case here;
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TABLE II
PRINCIPAL COMPONENTS ANALYSIS AND LOADING/ROTATION MATRIX
 that it is of low noise sensitivity, facilitating the handling
of volatile network traffic which typically incurs in the
problem concerned; and
 that it uses simple and readily accessible statistical calcu-
lations, avoiding the need of complex programming tasks.
As outlined previously, based on empirical analysis, there are
ten most crucial fields that may be exploited as indicators for
signs of fingerprinting attacks. To aid in improving the efficacy
of prediction of a fingerprinting attack, it is worthwhile to select
only the most significant fields out of the ten chosen fields
and also establish their corresponding relationships with each
other. This can be accomplished using PCA, where principal
components with higher variances reveal the most significant
attributes, showing additional information about the underlying
data. Based on this analysis, only the best components are
selected for the subsequent analysis as they practically signify
the complete data, and rest of the components can be ignored
based on the pre-decided threshold values, namely, Cumulative
Proportion of Variance, Eigenvalue or Loading (contribution
of each original field to the principal component). In this ex-
perimental investigation, traditionally accepted thresholds are
considered to determine the number of principal components
to use, including: Cumulative Proportion of V ariance
>85%, Eigenvalue >1 (from Kaiser’s rule [37]) and
Loading2 >1/Total Number of V ariables (which indicates
that Loading for any selected component should be relatively
higher than others) [38]–[40].
Table II(a) illustrates the standard deviation, variances and
cumulative proportion of variances for the ten principal compo-
nents. The cumulative proportion of variance for the first five
components is 0.8821793 (≈88%), which is higher than the
pre-decided threshold value of 85% (commonly adopted in the
literature [40]). From this, it is known that the first five com-
ponents are the most significant for the collected fingerprinting
data. The cumulative value of the remaining five components
is approximately 12%, indicating that their contribution to the
data is rather low. Further evaluation of the selected first five
components is useful, checking whether their eigenvalues >1
(see Fig. 8). It is true for the first four components, however,
Fig. 8. PCA Graph demonstrating eigenvalues for principal components.
the fifth component is slightly smaller than 1 (≈1), but it is
essential, in conjunction with the other four, to constitute the
85% cumulative proportion of the variance. Thus, unlike those
five components whose joint contribution is less than 15%, this
fifth one is retained as one of the most influential.
The selection of influential variables are additionally further
evaluated by examining the Loading values, showing the corre-
lation between an original variable and a principal component.
In this analysis, the Loadings of the first five most significant
principal components are computed as shown in Table II(b),
wherein, the five original fields of TCP Flags, TCP Options,
ICMP Requests, ICMP Packet Size and UDP Requests have
greater Loadings than the other five (TCP Window Size, IP
Time-To-Live, IPID Value, IP Type Of Services and TCP Urgent
Pointer). This indicates that the first five fields have greater
correlation with the five most significant principal components.
An in-depth analysis of the Loadings of the first five fields
in relation to the top five principal components leads to inter-
esting observations and inductions. In particular, the Loadings
of the first principal component with respect to the first five
original fields highlight its higher weighting and hence, greater
importance in the data. PC2 and PC5 are mainly represented
by the two fields of TCP Flags and TCP Options due to their
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greater Loadings. This means that the two original fields can
be grouped as a new TCP attribute (TCP Flags + TCP Options).
Similarly, PC3 and PC4 are mainly represented by the two fields
of ICMP Requests and ICMP Packet Size and thus, these two
original variables can be grouped as a new ICMP attribute (ICMP
Requests + ICMP Packet Size). The fifth field, UDP Requests,
has consistently greater Loadings in relation to all the five
principal components. This highlights its higher weighting and
importance in the data, but as a separate networking protocol.
From this observation, it may be considered as a separate UDP
attribute to be combined with TCP and ICMP attributes in
representing any principal components from PC1 to PC5. To-
gether, these three derived (i.e., combined) attributes from PCA
collectively represent the original data, thereby significantly
increasing computational efficiency.
B. Predicting OS Fingerprinting Attacks With Severity Levels
In the previous analysis, the three new attributes (related to
TCP, ICMP and UDP) are derived from the five most significant
principal components which are useful to act as a sign of OS
fingerprinting attacks. Additionally, it is very useful to determine
the value range of these attributes for developing a generic attack
prediction mechanism, due to their interrelationships with sev-
eral techniques underlying the data representation mechanisms
within commonly adopted OS fingerprinting tools. Yet, it is
equally important to be able to exploit these attributes in a
way that a proposed method can efficiently predict most OS
fingerprinting attacks accurately irrespective of the underlying
techniques/tools. Fuzzy set-based representation can help ad-
dress both issues effectively, by offering a value range for each
attribute to deal with the problem of imprecise attribute repre-
sentation in most OS fingerprinting techniques, accurately [6].
1) Fuzzy Input and Output Variables: In designing the fuzzy
inference system for predicting OS fingerprinting attacks, those
three influential attributes as identified previously are employed.
In particular, TCP flags and TCP options are merged as a single
attribute named Abnormal TCP Packet (ATCPP); ICMP requests
and ICMP packet size are merged as another single attribute
named Abnormal ICMP Packet (AICMPP); and the variable
UDP requests is kept unchanged but renamed as Abnormal
UDP Packet (AUDPP) to better match the eyes (see Figs. 9 to
11). The value ranges for these fuzzy variables are all set to
1-15 packets empirically, based on the analysis of thousands of
TCP/IP packets collected from Nmap and Xprobe2 simulations
and the underlying principles of fingerprinting tools. From this,
five fuzzy sets are defined on this common range: Very Low,
Low, Medium, High and Very High, respectively representing
five severity levels of an OS fingerprinting attack in the predic-
tion. In terms of the support of each of these fuzzy values, the
overall range is split such that Very Low is of the support of 0-4
packets, Low is of 2-6 packets, Medium is of 5-9 packets, High
is of 8-12 packets, and Very High is of 11-15 packets.
The fuzzy output variable from the system is named At-
tempted Fingerprinting Attack Possibility (AFAP), which sig-
nifies the predicted possibility of whether there may exist an
OS fingerprinting attack, based on computed correlation of the
Fig. 9. Fuzzy input variable ATCPP.
Fig. 10. Fuzzy input variable AICMPP.
Fig. 11. Fuzzy input variable AUDPP.
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Fig. 12. Fuzzy output variable AFAP.
Fig. 13. Fuzzy prediction system.
above three fuzzy input variables. Its range is represented within
the range of 0-100%, split also into similar five fuzzy terms:
Very Low, Low, Medium, High and Very High (see Fig. 12).
Particularly, the supports of these fuzzy values are empirically
defined as follows: Very Low is of the support 0-20%, Low is
of 10-40%, Medium is of 30-60%, High is of 50-80% and Very
High is of 70-100%.
2) Fuzzy Rule Base and Fuzzy Inference: The rules are cre-
ated on the basis of computed correlations between the three
fuzzy input variables and the output variable. The constraint
over this rule generation process is imposed such that the result-
ing fuzzy rule base should consist of generic rules applicable
to several commonly adopted OS fingerprinting techniques or
tools. Samples of the generated rules are shown in Fig. 14 and
the fuzzy rule base is presented in Fig. 15. Note that due to the
nature of the application problem, the rule base is rather sparse.
Any prediction performed through a direct use of these rules is
implemented by the FIS (see Fig. 13), which is based on the
popular Mamdani’s inference method [19].
3) D-FRI Sub-system: Low-interaction honeypots are typi-
cally restricted in their resources and capabilities. This natural
fact is in addition to the limitation of running sparse rule-based
Fig. 14. Sample fuzzy rules.
Fig. 15. Fuzzy rule base.
FIS and therefore, may adversely affect the effectiveness of the
detection. Furthermore, in practice, the system may not collect
all traffic whilst its associated operation is subject to perpetual
changes in network conditions. As Mamdani’s inference is only
effective when the input conditions are at least met partially with
any existing rule (otherwise, no detection can be made without
being able to fire any rule), D-FRI sub-system is employed here.
It helps to significantly reduce the occurrence of situations where
no detection is made when there is no match available given the
sparse rule base.
Initially, it performs a certain fuzzy rule interpolation when no
match is available from the given rules, generating an outcome.
The sub-system stores every such interpolated result (inter-
changeably termed interpolated rule when used together with the
otherwise unmatched values for the input variables), to enable
dynamic learning subsequently. This learning process is done
after reaching a pre-defined threshold of the interpolated rules.
Dynamic learning is only applied once a while, on such a group
of interpolated rules, in order to obtain and promote the most
concurrent rules to the sparse rule base.
Importantly, the dynamic rule promotion process enhances
the overall system’s efficacy in two ways: 1) increasing the
possibility of inference (thus reducing interpolation overheads)
in future, and 2) increasing the accuracy of the outcomes by
generating and making use of more accurate and concurrent
rules. This is evident in the experimental results to be presented
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Fig. 16. Accuracy per each prediction with D-FRI-Honeypot running fuzzy inference only.
next. Overall, the D-FRI sub-system improves the detection rate
of an active fingerprinting attack, by minimising false positives
and false negatives thanks to the exploitation of any recent traffic
and hence, update rules.
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
D-FRI-Honeypot is tested against five different OS finger-
printing tools Nmap, Xprobe2, NetScanTools Pro, SinFP3 and
Nessus, with its prediction result for an attempted OS finger-
printing attack recorded. These tools are selected to cover a di-
verse range of the underlying fingerprinting approaches, includ-
ing the TCP-based, ICMP-Based and combinational tools. This
is important to ensure rigorous testing of the D-FRI-Honeypot
against a variety of different fingerprinting attacks. In this ex-
perimentation, each fingerprinting tool is utilised to simulate
50 different attacks. Thus, a total of 250 attacks are carried
out on the honeypot. The performance of D-FRI-Honeypot is
recorded under two different conditions: 1) D-FRI-Honeypot
using just fuzzy inference and 2) D-FRI-Honeypot using D-FRI
sub-system.
Throughout the experimental investigations, the following
two performance indices are used for system evaluation: pre-
diction accuracy and detection sensitivity. Prediction accuracy
shows how accurately D-FRI-Honeypot has predicted each at-
tack. Note that the fuzzy linguistic outcomes (namely, Very
High, High, Medium, Low and Very Low) are translated into
numerical values in terms of weightage in percentages, such as
100%, 80%, 60%, 40% and 20% for evaluation purpose, with a
failure to detect an attempted attack considered as 0%. In addi-
tion to the prediction accuracy, it is also important to check how
many attacks are not detected or alerted by D-FRI-Honeypot.
Therefore, detection sensitivity is calculated as the ratio of
the number of True Positives over the total of True Positives
and False Negatives. The selection of theses two performance
indices prediction accuracy and detection sensitivity offered a
balanced approach to measuring the success (or otherwise) of
Fig. 17. Prediction Accuracy and Detection Sensitivity of D-FRI-Honeypot
running fuzzy inference only.
D-FRI-Honeypot, in terms of how many and how accurate it
may predict attempted fingerprinting attacks.
A. D-FRI-Honeypot Performance Using Fuzzy Inference
With D-FRI-Honeypot running fuzzy inference only, the pre-
diction accuracy for all the five tools investigated is illustrated
in Fig. 16. The overall prediction accuracy for each tool and the
associated 50 attempted attacks is calculated as follows: 70.8%
for Nmap, 70% for Xprobe2, 72% for NetScanTools Pro, 68%
for SinFP3 and 61.6% for Nessus. These results are depicted
in Fig. 17. The overall prediction accuracy of D-FRI-Honeypot
running just fuzzy inference is therefore, 68.48%.
The detection sensitivity of D-FRI-Honeypot without the
use of D-FRI for each tool is calculated over 50 attempted
attack, resulting in: 74% for Nmap, 70% for Xprobe2, 72%
for NetScanTools Pro, 68% for SinFP3 and 68% for Nessus.
These are also shown in Fig. 17. The overall detection sensitivity
of D-FRI-Honeypot using fuzzy inference is therefore, 70.4%.
This is itself a decent performance considering the sparse rule
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Fig. 18. Accuracy per each prediction of D-FRI-Honeypot with D-FRI sub-system.
Fig. 19. Prediction Accuracy and Detection Sensitivity of D-FRI-Honeypot
with D-FRI sub-system.
base given since the rule base covers approximately 56% of the
problem space (which equivalently speaking, would require 44%
more rules to form a dense rule base). It is nevertheless crucial
to improve this performance in order to detect more attempted
attacks.
B. D-FRI-Honeypot Performance Using D-FRI Sub-system
Use of D-FRI-Honeypot running with the D-FRI sub-system
helps in improving the system’s prediction performance. This is
reflected in the evaluation with both metrics prediction accuracy
and detection sensitivity (for the same attacks considered).
The prediction accuracy in response to each attack for all
the five fingerprinting tools is illustrated in Fig. 18. The pre-
diction accuracy per tool regarding the 50 attempted attacks is
calculated as: 80.4% for Nmap, 79.6% for Xprobe2, 86.6% for
NetScanTools Pro, 79.2% for SinFP3 and 73.6% for Nessus.
These are summarised in Fig. 19. The prediction accuracy of
D-FRI-Honeypot running the D-FRI sub-system is therefore,
TABLE III
SUMMARY OF PREDICTION ACCURACY AND DETECTION SENSITIVITY
OF D-FRI-HONEYPOT
79.88%. This demonstrates a considerable improvement over
the system without the use of D-FRI.
The detection sensitivity of D-FRI-Honeypot with D-FRI sub-
system for each tool is also calculated over the 50 attempted
attacks, resulting in 88% for Nmap, 82% for Xprobe2, 90% for
NetScanTools Pro, 82% for SinFP3 and 86% for Nessus. These
are shown in Fig. 19. The overall detection sensitivity of D-FRI-
Honeypot using D-FRI is 85.6%, a significant improvement over
the case where no D-FRI is applied. More detailed comparisons
are given below.
C. Comparing D-FRI-Honeypot With or Without D-FRI
The above two sets of experimentations, running D-FRI-
Honeypot with just Mamdani’s fuzzy inference and with D-FRI
sub-system respectively, have to a certain extent shown the
strengthened performance of the latter, given the same sparse
fuzzy rule base. As a matter of fact, the employment of D-FRI has
improved the prediction accuracy of D-FRI-Honeypot against
attempted attacks by a rate of approximately 10% for each attack
tool and a rate of 11.4% overall (see Fig. 20). Similarly, the
detection sensitivity of D-FRI-Honeypot against the attempted
attack for each fingerprinting tool by approximately 12% and by
15.2% overall (see Fig. 21).
To reinforce the performance gains through the use of D-FRI,
both prediction accuracy and detection sensitivity of D-FRI-
Honeypot with or without D-FRI are summarised in Table III.
Clearly, D-FRI sub-system helps D-FRI-Honeypot performing
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Fig. 20. Prediction Accuracy of D-FRI-Honeypot with D-FRI or without D-
FRI (i.e., only FIS).
Fig. 21. Detection Sensitivity of D-FRI-Honeypot with D-FRI or without D-
FRI (i.e., only FIS).
by utilising fuzzy inference and rule interpolation with the sparse
rule base, reducing the failure rate of inference. Note that owing
to the dynamic promotion of interpolated rules, computational
overheads of interpolation are reduced as the detection process
progresses. This is because the dynamic enrichment of the rule
base will facilitate increasingly more direct rule firing without
the need to carry out interpolation.
D. Analysis of D-FRI-Honeypot Results Running D-FRI
Examining the results of D-FRI-Honeypot with the use of
D-FRI for the different OS fingerprinting tools reveals more in-
teresting observations. In general, D-FRI-Honeypot has proven
to be very effective in the prediction of all detected fingerprinting
attacks, with an average rate of 93.55% predicted attacks being
regarded at the Very High/High levels. In response to individual
type of attacking tools, the following results are attained: 88.63%
for Nmap, 100% for Xprobe2, 100% for NetScanTools Pro,
100% for SinFP3 and 79.1% for Nessus. This means that D-FRI-
Honeypot can predict a majority of attempted OS fingerprinting
attacks as Very High/High for all the five fingerprinting tools, as
summarised in Table IV.
TABLE IV
PREDICTION BY D-FRI-HONEYPOT FOR ATTEMPTED ATTACKS
USING DIFFERENT OS FINGERPRINTING TOOLS
Table IV also shows the exceptions where the predictions are
made at a severity level different from Very High/High. These
are mostly related to Nmap and Nessus as they can perform a
wide range of OS fingerprinting attacks, some of which rely on
HTTP and other application layer protocols, whilst the present
investigation is concentrated on the core protocols of the network
and transport layer (TCP, ICMP, UDP and IP). Using HTTP and
other application layer protocols, a reduced reliance on the core
TCP/IP protocols results, in the process of obtaining OS finger-
printing information that may lead to the generation of lower
TCP/IP traffic and fewer abnormalities/patterns for the system
to predict. Whilst HTTP and other application layer protocols
can be included in the detection process, with each protocol
targeting a very specific attack, this will significantly increase
the complexity and overheads of the proposed approach. With
just core TCP/IP protocols included in all tools/attacks based
on TCP/IP stack fingerprinting, a lightweight generic approach
is made feasible, being capable of predicting all TCP/IP based
fingerprinting attacks.
E. Accuracy of D-FRI Generated Dynamic Rules
In order to test the accuracy of the dynamically promoted
rules for the D-FRI-Honeypot, a total of 20 new rules are
generated from the collection of 400 interpolated rules. These
new rules are added to the original sparse rule base to enhance
the honeypot’s ability to generate correct results and minimise
future computational effort. Significantly, reduction of future
interpolation also leads to a decrease of any errors caused by the
interpolative process.
The accuracy of the dynamic rules is compared to: 1) that of
directly using the interpolated rules (%dvi), and 2) that of the
ground-truth rules (%dvt) which are generated on the basis of
translating the underlying defining fuzzy grids, in exactly the
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TABLE V
ACCURACY OF D-FRI GENERATED DYNAMIC RULES
same way as utilised to create those original rules in the sparse
rule base. Note that it is purely for experimental comparison
purpose that such ‘ground-truth’ rules are provided assuming
that there have been sufficient training data available for their
creation. In reality, there do not exist such rules, otherwise there
is no need for rule interpolation given a dense rule base.
The differences between the accuracies attainable by the use
of just static rules for interpolation and that of the ground-
truth rules (e%ivt) are also provided. In all aforementioned
comparisons, the percentage error % = /rangey is computed
corresponding to the range of the consequent variable. Table V
exhibits the average values and standard deviations with re-
spect to the three measurements. The result clearly supports
the present work, showing the benefits of promoting accurate
rules through the application of D-FRI. Indeed, the results of
the intelligent dynamic honeypot are closer to the use of the
ground-truth rules.
VII. LIMITATIONS OF D-FRI-HONEYPOT
The D-FRI-Honeypot has been successfully tested against
several fingerprinting tools in identifying a fingerprinting attack
in-situ. However, it has a number of limitations:
 D-FRI-Honeypot may not always generate accurate results
for untested fingerprinting tools, despite it has been devel-
oped according to the underlying attack principles of pop-
ular fingerprinting tools (Nmap and Xprobe2), and further
tested for three other tools NetScanTools Pro, SinFP3 and
Nessus.
 D-FRI-Honeypot may not generate accurate results for
fingerprinting attacks that utilise unknown mechanisms
other than those described previously.
 D-FRI-Honeypot is mainly focused on the core protocols
TCP, UDP and ICMP, without considering the application
layer protocols (e.g., HTTP, FTP, SMTP, SNMP) which
may be exploited in a fingerprinting attack and thereby,
may affect its prediction accuracy.
 D-FRI-Honeypot is developed for low-interaction honey-
pots where fingerprinting is a serious threat to revealing
its identity; consequently, it is neither focused on nor
recommended for high-interaction honeypots.
 D-FRI-Honeypot may generate false positives for those
attacks which exhibit similar abnormalities or patterns to
those identified in the empirical simulations.
 D-FRI-Honeypot produces prediction results that are in-
dicative as they are in fuzzy linguistic terms; thus, further
investigation to prove or disprove such a result is required
if a boolean result is sought.
 D-FRI-Honeypot works depending upon the volume of
traffic sampled as input to perform accurate detection of
a fingerprinting attack; therefore, any obstacle in traffic
may affect the entire identification and prediction process.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This paper has presented a dynamic fuzzy rule interpolation
based honeypot called D-FRI-Honeypot for detecting or predict-
ing active fingerprinting attacks, including their severity levels.
Earlier, there was little work available to detect and predict an
attempted fingerprinting attack on honeypots. This observation
has led to the investigation of various fingerprinting attacks and
the development of an intelligent and adaptive D-FRI-Honeypot
in the research reported herein.
The design of D-FRI-Honeypot has been focused on the
most common OS fingerprinting attacks. The simulation of
fingerprinting attacks and data (TCP/IP packets) collection have
both been accomplished by employing KFSensor honeypot tool
and Nmap and Xprobe2 fingerprinting tools. Based on prelim-
inary observations and empirical evidence, important fields of
collected TCP/IP packets have been analysed in an effort to
establish abnormalities or patterns as a sign of an attempted
fingerprinting attack. Subsequently, PCA has been utilised to
determine the most influential TCP/IP fields, which are then used
to develop the honeypot based on D-FRI. D-FRI-Honeypot has
been successfully tested against five popular fingerprinting tools.
The analysis of experimental results achieved has demonstrated
that D-FRI-Honeypot can significantly improve the prediction
accuracy and detection sensitivity, covering a majority of at-
tempted OS fingerprinting attacks, while possessing the abil-
ity of accurately and dynamically enriching the system’s own
knowledge base online.
Whilst D-FRI-Honeypot is promising, encompassing several
types of TCP/IP based fingerprinting attacks, it may omit certain
fingerprinting attacks that take advantage of application layer
protocols such as HTTP, SMTP, FTP, SMB, NTP, SNMP and
SSH. Thus, as an important future work, it is essential to enhance
D-FRI-Honeypot so that it could incorporate these fingerprinting
attacks. Of course, work also remains to be done in dealing with
those shortcomings identified in the preceding section.
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